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Denis Franco Silva, Juiz de Fora /Brazil 
 
From Human Rights to Person Rights 
Legal Reflections on Posthumanism and Human Enhancement 
 
Abstract: In the intersection between law, science and technology lies the debate on the overcoming of 
the boundaries of the biological structure of the human being and its implications on the idea of 
human  rights,  on  the  concept  of  person  and  on  the  conception  of  equality  –  being  the  latter  a 
fundamental tenet of a democracy.  
Posthumanism  assumes  a  biological  inadequacy  of  the  human  body  regarding  the  quantity, 
complexity  and  quality  of  information  which  it  can  muster.  The  same  occurs  with  the  needs  of 
accuracy, speed or strength demanded by the contemporary environment. Under such perspective, the 
body is considered to be an inefficient structure, with a short lifespan, easy to break and hard to fix. 
The body, always seen as the locus for the definition of  human, emerges as the object of a 
commodification process that seeks to exonerate men from their burden - by declination towards a 
virtual existence, totally free and rational - or to enhance them with bionic devices or drugs.  
This issue has already been the subject of attention by many scholars like Savulescu, Rodotà, 
Broston, Fukuyama and even Habermas. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to seek, by criticism and revision of the positions on the 
foreseen problems of this process, an adequate theoretical approach on issues like the concept of 
person  and  its  connection  with  the  idea  of  human  rights  in  order  to  promote  the  fundamental 
statement that all men are equal without disregard to the values of diversity and personal identity. 
Keywords: Posthumanism; Human Rights; Equality; Concept of person 
 
I. Posthumanity and human rights 
A posthuman future, once a subject of the cyberpunk literature and science-fiction movies, is 
becoming  an  issue  of  interest  and  debate  for  many  scholars.  The  advances  and  foreseen 
development of genetic engineering, bionics, artificial intelligence and pharmaceuticals are a 
contemporary  concern  regarding  its  impacts  on  the  idea  of  humanity  and,  for  extension, 
particularly in law, in the idea of human rights. 
The  central  idea  of  posthumanism  is  the  principle  of  self-directed  and  conscious 
evolution. Such principle asserts the conviction that it is not only possible, but desirable, to 
decide  our  evolutionary  destiny  both  as  a  species  and  as  individuals  through  the  use  of 
technology, which means enhancing the human biological make-up. 
 2 
Thus, the human enhancement would be a process of overcoming the human  biological 
stage of evolution  towards a posthuman stage, in a collective perspective, or of improving the 
biological structure of one’s body, in an individual perspective. The body, always seen as the 
locus for the definition of human, emerges as the object of a process that seeks to exonerate 
men from their burden - by declination towards a virtual existence, totally free and rational, 
currently  named  singularity  -  or  to  enhance  them  with  bionic  devices,  drugs  or  genetic 
engineering. 
Before this issue, as Rodotá
1 points, stands out a question about the extension and fate of 
some fundamental rights historically identified as “human rights”.  Can the transition towards 
a posthuman condition undermine such rights (believed to be grounded on a shared human 
nature)?  Words  like  “commodification”  or  “eugenics”  immediately  pop  up  and  a  serious 
concern about the equality emerges. 
As one can see, the first foreseen problem assumes that the philosophical foundation of a 
category of fundamental rights, known as “human rights”, depends on the idea of a “human 
nature”. 
The second great concern would be that the very idea of political equality is based on an 
empirical assumption of natural equality of men. Underneath the idea of equality of rights 
would be the belief that we all have a human essence, despite some small differences such as 
skin  color,  beauty  or  intelligence.  This  would  be  the  guarantee  that  all  individuals  have 
intrinsic value and, therefore, the heart of political liberalism. Fukuyama 
2, better than no 
other, express this concern while questioning which rights will these enhanced creatures claim 
and, more importantly, which rights they may have when compared to those individuals who 
have not been modified. 
Basically, the two exposed apprehensions depend on a controversial link between human 
rights and a shared human nature
3. 
 
II. Human rights and human nature: a controversial link 
As  mentioned,  the  two  central  concerns  –  about  the  idea  of  human  enhancement  and  a 
posthumanity condition – seem to endorse a normative cognitivism derived from the idea of 
human nature or human essence.  
 
                                                           
1 Stéfano Rodotá, Il corpo e il post-umano, 2008, 15 (yet unpublished). 
2 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: consequences of the biothecnology revolution, 2002. 
3  In this sense, Leon Kass, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin e Bill McKibben, called by Nick  
Broston “bioconservationists”. See  Nick Broston, In Defense of Posthuman Dignity Bioethics. 19, number 03 
(2005),  3 
But to establish a link between human rights and human nature is not that easy. Can 
human rights be considered grounded on a particular biological structure, that of the homo 
sapiens species? If so, these rights would relate only to a particular set of individuals or 
group: those who belong to the community of the human species. Moral universalism, and 
therefore,  universal  rights,  would  be  justified  as  a  normative  derivation  of  this  nature  or 
essence of men which is incrusted on the biological substractum of the species. 
This concern with the human nature or essence is a frequent theme in the literature on the 
ethics  of  human  enhancement  through  biotechnology.  However,  there  are  few  occasions 
where one can define what is meant by the term "human nature" and it is usually taken as 
meaning some kind of normative essentialism, through which it would be possible to derive a 
set of substantive rules from the biological constitution of human species 
4 . One cannot, of 
course, accept this position, since it reflects, in itself, a secular version of medieval thought 
about the place and role of human beings in the universe. 
The Sociobiological approach has in fact greatly contributed to this view on hu man 
nature 
5. Since the end of the 70’s, it’s reductionist view of human beings, identifying them 
with their phylogenetic heritage, has spread. 
The alternative presented to sociobiology is not less controversial. It is the explanation of 
human  nature  or  essence  through  the  idea  of  original  incompleteness  offered  by  the 
philosophical anthropology. 
This  view  on  human  nature  already  has  its  origins  Greek  mythology,  such  as  in 
Protagoras tale of how human nature is the result of the dialectic between Epimeteu and 
Prometeu. In short, Epimeteu attributes biological virtues to all animals, but when it came the 
time  for  men  to  receive  their  share,  all  the  performative  gifts  were  over  and  men  were 
convicted to inadequacy. At this point, Prometeu intervenes giving  men fire and technique. 
As a compensation for the biological incompleteness another dimension is given to men, that 
of culture. 
This  idea  also  pervades  the  thought  of  Della  Mirandola,  in  the  Oratio  pro  Hominis 
Dignitate: Man was designed as a being that can be determined freely and choose his own 
destiny. Its hallmark is the fact of not being equipped with fixed properties such as animals 
are and, therefore, not constrained by any relationship with nature. 
In fact, this Greek myth leads to two very different tendencies on techno-science and 
human nature. 
 
                                                           
4 Allen Buchanan, Human Nature and enhancement, Bioethics, 2,3 issue 3 (2008) 
5 Roberto Marchesini. Il tramonto dell’uomo: la prospetiva post-umanista, 2009. 4 
With  emphasis  on  Prometheus  punishment  and  influenced  by  the  sociobiological 
approach, the first tendency looks at the relationship between man and technology allowing 
for a strict separation between nature and culture. The technique is compared to a glove to be 
put  over  human  nature  (the  biological  basis)  amplifying  its  operational  capabilities,  but 
without contaminating or compromising its integrity. The shift of boundaries between nature 
and culture leads to the sin of hybris. The idea of nature is connected to the idea of purity, 
innocence, no contamination by  culture or technique.  In this  vision, which can be  called 
hyperumanism, two problems emerge. 
First,  it  supports  a  vision  of  simply  reactive,  condemnation  and  rejection  of  new 
pervasive technologies of the body (or of human nature) called biotechnology. A reaction 
close to Luddism. 
Second, the body is a sanctified, pure, immaculate body. It, therefore, must satisfy a 
prototypical model shared by the community in which the person must fit. The “different” 
takes  the  form  of  “deviant”  and  many  ways  of  conforming  one’s  own  personal  physical 
identity are, therefore, marginalized, representing a menace to the idea of  fundamental rights, 
especially one’s right to his or her own body. In fact, the idea of a subjective right to our own 
bodies is reduced to an objective model of preserving body integrity. 
Considering  that  Human  rights  must  play  a  role  in  the  protection  of  minorities  and 
singular conceptions of the good, to shape them from this idea of human nature or essence 
doesn’t seem adequate. 
The  second  tendency  emphasizes  the  idea  of  biological  incompleteness.  The  man, 
primitive,  lacking  adaptation,  without  any  specialization,  biologically  inapt,  assures  his 
central place and role in the world through the reverser effect of culture on nature 
6 . In this 
vision, which can be called transhumanism, the myth  of incompleteness encounters Decartes 
dualism, which emphasizes the dimension of the  cogito when it comes to the idea of human 
nature and gives rise to the feeling of disregard to the biological body, a mere burden to be 
carried, a prison to the human essence 
7 . 
Here, the idea of boundaries between the human biological basis (nature) and technique 
(culture) - the concept of the sin of  hybris - is totally abandoned in favor of a vision of the 
body as an object belonging to the sphere of nature and, therefore, absolutely submitted to the 
will of the subjectivity of which it is in service, but is not part of nor represents. 
 
                                                           
6 See Marchesini (note 5) 
7 See Broston (note 3) 5 
The  consequence  of  this  vision  is  the  attitude  of  submission  to  and  acceptance  of 
technological developments without any limits, despite the risk of disappearance of the very 
idea of personhood trough the concept of singularity. Such risk exists because without a body, 
that is, without an insertion in time and space, any sort of consciousness is unconceivable for 
the  lack  of  interface  with  the  world,  with  others  and  the  very  historical  dimension  that 
characterizes  an  identity,  which  is  necessarily  diachronic,  and  not  synchronic  like  a 
computational algorithm, which is deprived of intentionality, though a system that processes 
information 
8. 
So, it doesn’t seem easy to ground the foundations of human rights on the idea of  a 
shared  essence  or  of  a  shared  human  nature,  especially  if  the  purpose  or  objective  is  to 
strengthen their effectiveness. 
 
III. The idea of person rights as an alternative to human rights and its link with the 
posthuman thought 
The doctrine of human rights has been developed with a particular focus on the belongingness 
to the human genre. However, as a mere form of rejection of the positivist formalism of law 
regarding the category of “person” in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth 
century. One can say, as a measure of rhetorical reinforcement aiming to avoid the exclusion 
of any human being from the universe of persons, which means to avoid the denial of dignity 
to any human being. 
On dignity, thus, on the concept of person, lies the true foundation of the historically 
called human rights. As  stated by Spaemann 
9: “with Boecius the concept of person has 
become a nomem dignitates, therefore, a concept with axiological connotation. With Kant, 
who  operates  the  connection  between  dignity  and  autonomy,  ‘person’  becomes  a  central 
concept in the foundation of human rights”. 
Three distinct crucial co-related features can be identified on the concept of person: the 
rational self, the psychophysical identity and the feature of alterity, which means the openness 
to others or the relational aspect. 
These three features put together generate, in time and space, agents able to elect ends or 
goals  and  to  have  interests  and  desires.    They  also  entail  the  ability  of  such  agents  to 
reexamine and possibly abandon their goals and desires. The abilities themselves, and the 
person constituted by them, are previous to any end, interest or desire. When one talks about 
an interest or a desire, a subject of such interest or desire is assumed: a person.  
                                                           
8 Pietro Barcelona e Tommaso Garufi, Il furto dell’anima: la narrazione post-umana, 2008. 
9 Robert Spaemann. Persone: la differenza tra  “qualcosa” e “qualcuno”, 2007, 4. 6 
It is also assumed that the identity of a person does not change with his or hers interests 
or desires. This separation between the person and its ends, interests or desires is what allows 
her  to  detach  herself  from  the  causal  chain  of  events  in  which  the  past,  as  an  empirical 
phenomenon, is immersed. Therefore, the possibility of electing ends or having desires is not 
determined by the causal chain of events so that the elected end or interest can be normatively 
attributed to the person.  Ergo, a person is endowed of inherent dignity by the virtue of being 
able to, in relation with others, constitute for himself or herself an identity and to be able to 
pursue  the  ends  or  goals  elected  and  valuated  from  this  identity.. 
In this process, the presence of an individualized psychophysical domain is essential for the 
understanding that his or her ends, desires, beliefs, or interests are elected separately from the 
aims, desires or beliefs of others and provides, in this manner, a stable platform in time and 
space for the construction of an identity. 
These beings, who possess these characteristics in any moment of their existence, are 
ends in themselves and therefore endowed with inherent dignity. They are persons, and the so 
called protection of human rights or fundamental rights is a protection afforded to the free 
construction of a personal identity and the quest of one’s own elected ends. 
Admitting that all humans are persons does not mean, however, to concede that only 
humans can be persons. This kind of thought encloses the idea of what is a person - a concept 
of axiological entities opened to the world, to alterity and therefore to difference - in a self-
sufficient ontology. 
In  fact,  the  coordinates  within  which  those  three  characteristics  are  recognized  have 
radically changed historically in a process of growing expansion of the universe of beings or 
entities  recognized  as  persons  (the  opposite  sex,  the  foreigner,  the  other  ethnicity  and, 
currently, all humans). 
The idea that fundamental rights are grounded in the concept of person, rather than in 
human  nature  or  essence,  provides,  therefore,  a  new  approach  to  the  problem  of  the 
man/technology interface or the process of hybridization between humans and machines or 
non-human elements. 
Unlike the traditional approaches on the concept of person, which emphasize the feature 
of rationality or the feature of individualized psychophysical domain for the construction of 
an identity – despite the necessary co-dependence relation of the three referred features of the 
concept of person – the focus of the approach taken here is alterity. 
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In  fact,  the  goal  here  is  to  recognize  a  process  named  by  Marchesini 
10as 
“anthropo(de)centrism”, meaning the removal of men from their claimed central position in 
the universe, a claim which has arisen with humanist thought. “Anthropo(de)centrism” also 
implies the comprehension of posthumanism not in a strict sense of an evolutionary stage, but 
as a new approach on man and his relations with the world. In other words, a humanism 
without anthropocentrism. 
The  quest  for  a  human  nature  or  human  essence  departs  from  an  anthropocentric 
ontology that projects itself onto ethical and epistemological levels, according to which man 
would be a self-referred being, the measure for everything else and self-contained. Thus, from 
an anthropocentric thinking, a rigid separation between human and non-human emerges on an 
ontological dimension – the existence of a human essence that opposes itself to everything  
that is non-human –, ethical dimension – man, beholder of dignity, is the only moral agent 
and patient and everything else assumes an instrumental dimension – and epistemological – 
acceptance or refusal  of cognitive objects  by  anthropomorphization or instrumentalization 
with basis on a simplificating  categorial duality of human versus non-human 
11 
The anthropodecetrism here proposed is the substitution of the concept of human for the 
concept of person as the gravitational center of a system of references from which man relates 
with himself and the world. 
With  an  axiological  concept  occupying  the  central  position  of  such  a  system,  a 
paradigmatic ontology based on the duality human  versus non-human cannot be sustained in 
ethical  and  epistemological  levels.  Referring  to  the  central  subject  here  approached,  this 
means that an ethical paradigm based on the idea of human nature cannot be sustained. 
Considering  that  the  concept  of  person  presents  within  its  features  a  dimension  of 
alterity, and alterity can be defined as openness to the other and to the world, the centrality of 
the concept of person allows an expansion of the circle of recognition  and the inclusion of  
possible non-human entities in an alterity relation as subjects, regardless of the fact that these 
entities  do  not  belong  to  the  homo  sapiens  species,  do  not  possess  the  same  biological 
structure or do not possess any biological structure at all 
12. 
 
                                                           
10 See  Marchesini (note 5). 
11 Michelle Farisco, Uomo – natura –  tecnica: il modelo postumanistico, 2008, 58. 
12 Roberto Marchesini, Alterity and the non-human, Humanimalia, v1 n2, 2010 91-96. 8 
Alterity – meant as a state or quality of what is diverse or distinct, and not only referring 
to those entities with whom is established a discursive relation – contributes in two aspects for 
the construction of a personal identity 
13: 
 
a)  Other entities as a basis for a confrontation from which emerges a subject. 
b)  Other entities as orientation points in a dialectical polarity that can give support to 
the construction of an identity. 
 
The relevant issue on this approach, based on the expansion of the circle of alterity, is the 
evaluation  of  what  is  different  or  divergent  no  longer  as  a  form  of  contamination  of  or 
deviance from a human nature or essence. Differences are recognized plainly as “differences” 
and must be integrated to the process of construction of a personal identity as elements for 
confrontation and orientation. The “different” is recognized only as such, without axiological 
prejudice. This is the dimension of alterity implied by the concept of person: openness not 
only to the “other” but also to the world. 
Hence, non-human alterity assumes a cofactorial role regarding the construction of a 
personal identity and no longer can the technique be compared to a glove to be put over 
human nature (the biological basis) amplifying its operational capabilities, but is integrated 
with it and constitutes it. This is the posthuman thinking here advocated: a person-centered 
proposal  of  interaction  between  human  and  non-human  and  also  between  nature  and 
technique. 
A man and a tool, for example, are taken as a hybrid system that represents more than the 
mere sum of the potentialities of each. The hybridization gives rise to potentialities that didn’t 
existed before and man ends up transformed by the interaction or relation with the tool. The 
feeling of incompleteness is not a consequence of the biological constitution of man, but 
emerges from the relation between man and technique
14. 
Therefore, the ideas of nature and culture or technique are intertwined and when it comes 
to the definition of a biotechnology, it seems that every technology is a biotechnology
15  due 
to the fact that it: 
 
                                                           
13 See Marchesini (note 12). 
14 On this particular issue, see  Andy Clark,  Natural-Born Cyborgs: minds, technologies and the future of human 
intelligence, 2003;  Andy Clark,  Mindware: an introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science, 2001 and 
Andy Clark, Being There: putting brain, body and world together again, 1997. 
15 See Farisco (note 11). 9 
a)  modifies the perception of performative optimality and therefore, of biological 
incompleteness (in decades); 
b)  modifies man’s ontogenetical environment (in centuries); 
c)  redistributes natural selection pressures modifying a population genetic pool (in 
millenniums).  
 
For example, after the discovery of fire it has become essential for human survival. It also has 
modified the environment in which human genetic structure should fit and altered the shared 
DNA of entire populations by changing the process of natural selection. The same thing can 
be said of antibiotics or even of airplanes. 
Hence  the  comprehension  of  human  rights  as  fundamental  rights  of  persons,  not  of 
human beings, clarifies where these rights are rooted: not on human nature, but in the dignity 
of persons being them ends in themselves and, therefore, on the freedom of constituting and 
developing a personal identity stemming from alterity. An anthropo(de)centered conception, 
focused in the concept of person, implies a reinforcement of the foundations  of such rights as 
universal rights. 
But one question remains: is human enhancement through technology able to menace the 
idea of equality among persons in such a way as to threaten political liberalism and the very 
idea of democracy? 
 
IV. Human enhancement and equality 
Maybe there is a strong argument against human enhancement. Not a sin of hybris or an 
appeal to human nature, but the claim that the social foundations upon which individuals see 
each other as equals can be eroded by enhancement procedures. 
This claim assumes that any social cooperation system and the mutual recognition of 
individuals as persons depends on a so called “natural lottery” regarding health, intelligence, 
strength, wealth, social class and skills 
16. The fact that no one is responsible for its winnings 
or losses in this natural lottery and the indetermination of future results would be what allows 
the idea that all persons find themselves in a position of equality. 
However,  this  claim  also  assumes  a  society  organized  upon  pure  conventional 
foundations in which consideration for the other and reciprocal assistance depends on a high 
level of recognition among its members that only could be achieved through sharing the same 
                                                           
16 Eva Orlebeke Caldera, Cognitive enhancement and theories of justice: contemplating the malleability of nature 
and self.  Journal of evolution and technology, v18, issue 1, 2008. 10 
biological basis and the possibility of receiving something in exchange. Social solidarity is 
taken as a convention and not as a normative assumption. 
In this regard, the very concept of person implies solidarity duties as a projection of the 
dimension of alterity, that is, openness to others and to their differences. It is due to this 
alterity  dimension,  and  not  thanks  to  the  myth  of  a  “natural  lottery”  that  we  can  accept 
differences in social class, intelligence and talent, among others. In fact, the “natural lottery” 
argument could explain equality on a fictitious context like Rawls’ original position. But in 
concrete situations, even though one can attribute responsibility to others for their winnings or 
losses, the mutual recognition as persons, therefore as equals, stands.  The concept of person 
offers  a  broader  way  for  mutual  recognition  for,  due  to  alterity,  equality  derives  from 
personhood itself: someone that is an end in himself and beholder of dignity, regardless of his 
social class, talents, skills or other differences. 
The objection of “unsustainable inequality” to human enhancements or to the idea of 
posthumanity  is  also  based  on  a  wrong  assumption:  that  the  co-related  features  that 
characterize personhood are not taken as sufficient or adequate but are articulated with the 
idea of dignity, and therefore equality, in a gradual way 
17. It’s a wrong assumption simply 
because persons cannot be more or less ends in themselves. The concept of person is not 
gradual.  
It must be noted that substantial differences of opportunity or differences that represent 
competitive advantage generated by enhancement are not qualitatively different from those 
differences already existing, like substantial differences generated by different opportunities 
on education which reflects and can be caused by differences in social class. 
Therefore,  the  differences  or  the  substantial  inequality  that  might  be  generated  by 
enhancement  technologies  can  be  compensated  by  measures  of  distributive  justice,  like 
affirmative action, if avoiding such differences is judged relevant, and not by imposing limits 
that  transmutes  a  fundamental  right  as  the  free  development  of  a  personal  identity  and, 
therefore, one’s right to his own body on a mere objective protection of body integrity. 
As one can see, there are no reasons to reject enhancement in general or in principle. 
Particular cases or specific enhancement technologies are, of course, in dispute. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The relation between human rights and the idea of human nature or essence, therefore, seems 
difficult and dangerous. Instead of leading to broader mutual recognition and acceptance of 
                                                           
17 James Wilson, Transhumanism and moral equality, Bioethics, 21 n8, 2007 11 
differences,  it  promotes  the  emergence  of  paradigmatic  ontologies  that  push  the  concrete 
realization  of  different  forms  of  personal  identity  in  the  direction  of  transgression  and 
marginalization. 
 
To assume personhood and the concept of person as a basis for human rights – through 
the dimension of alterity –  reinforces its character of fundamental and universal rights and 
the normative solidarity implicit in the idea of dignity. 
Therefore, human rights are person rights, not a privilege of humans, regardless of the 
psychophysical constitution of a person in a near posthuman future. 
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